Linking the Culpability and Circumstantial Evidence Requirements for the Spoliation Inference by Dropkin, Drew D.
DROPKIN IN FINAL READ 06/03/02 12:06 PM
Notes
LINKING THE CULPABILITY AND
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
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INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 1989, Donald Vodusek, Sr., fueled his boat for
a family trip from Pasadena, Maryland, to Baltimore’s inner harbor.1
Approximately thirty minutes after he siphoned gas into the cabin
cruiser in preparation for departure, Vodusek turned on the boat’s
bilge pump.2 Tragically, the boat exploded.3 Vodusek suffered second-
and third-degree burns and died three months later due to burn-
related complications.4
Shirley Vodusek, Donald’s wife, filed suit in federal district
court5 against the boat’s manufacturer, Bayliner Marine Corporation,
and the retail dealer of the boat, Stammer’s Marine Center, Inc., al-
leging that a faulty bilge pump switch ignited vapors from a leaky fuel
system to cause the fatal explosion.6 Vodusek retained Douglas Hal-
sey, an expert in marine vessel safety, to examine the boat and to pre-
sent testimony supporting Vodusek’s theory.7 During the pretrial
Copyright © 2002 by Drew D. Dropkin.
1. Vodusek v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 71 F.3d 148, 151 (4th Cir. 1995).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. The district court’s decision in Vodusek was unpublished, and the synopsis of the un-
derlying facts provided in this Note draws entirely from the summary of the facts provided by
the court of appeals.
6. Vodusek, 71 F.3d at 151.
7. Id. at 155.
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examination of the boat,
“Mr. Halsey and the Vodusek boys virtually attacked the boat
with a chain saw and sledge hammer. The area which is critical to
the theory eventually presented by Mr. Halsey[ ] was literally ripped
apart. The integrity of the structure was violated. . . .
. . . Mr. Halsey’s activity made it impossible for his own theory to
be verified or for the Defendants to make a full and fair inspection
to develop alternative theories based on the evidence.”8
The defendants asked the court to rectify their inability to examine
the boat.9 In response to their request, the district court issued the
following instruction:
“[I]t is the duty of a party, a party’s counsel and any expert witness,
not to take action that will cause the destruction or loss of relevant
evidence where that will hinder the other side from making its own
examination and investigation of all potentially relevant evidence.
If you find in this case [that] the plaintiff’s counsel and agents, in-
cluding Mr. Halsey, failed to fulfill this duty, then . . . you are per-
mitted to, if you feel justified in doing so, assume that evidence
made unavailable to the defendants by acts of plaintiff’s counsel or
agents, including Mr. Halsey, would have been unfavorable to the
plaintiff’s theory in this case.”10
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Bayliner Marine and Stam-
mer’s Marine Center,11 and the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit affirmed the decision.12
In Vodusek v. Bayliner Marine Corp., the district court con-
fronted the shockingly pervasive problem of spoliation of evidence.13
Spoliation occurs when a party destroys, mutilates, alters, or conceals
relevant evidence.14 When evidence is spoliated, courts are called
8. Id. (quoting the district court’s unpublished opinion).
9. Id.
10. Id. (quoting the district court’s unpublished opinion).
11. Id. at 152.
12. Id.
13. For a discussion of the prevalence of spoliation in civil litigation, see infra notes 24–34
and accompanying text.
14. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1409 (7th ed. 1999); Kathleen Kedigh, Spoliation: To the
Careless Go the Spoils, 67 UMKC L. REV. 597, 598 (1999).
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upon to fashion a remedy for the nonspoliating party.15 Although this
remedy may take many forms,16 one prominent and oft-employed ju-
dicial response is the issuance of a jury instruction that mirrors the in-
struction in Vodusek: if a party has failed to preserve potentially rele-
vant evidence, the jury may infer that the evidence was destroyed
because the evidence was adverse to that party’s case.17 This jury in-
struction is commonly referred to as a “spoliation inference.”18
Although courts generally agree that a spoliation inference is ap-
propriate only if the spoliating party has violated a duty to preserve
evidence,19 courts have disagreed about two possible additional re-
quirements for the inference. First, courts differ in their approaches
to the spoliator’s state of mind.20 Evidence can be spoliated along a
continuum of culpability—it can be destroyed innocently, negligently,
recklessly, intentionally, or in bad faith.21 Must the nonspoliating
party establish the culpability of the spoliator before a spoliation in-
ference is issued? If so, what is the minimum level of culpability that
must be shown?
Second, courts differ about the need for the nonspoliating party
to provide circumstantial proof that the spoliated evidence would
have been unfavorable to the spoliating party.22 While some courts
require the nonspoliating party to provide circumstantial evidence
merely to establish the identity of the spoliated evidence, other courts
15. See Charles R. Nesson, Incentives to Spoliate Evidence in Civil Litigation: The Need for
Vigorous Judicial Action, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 793, 806 (1991) (describing the critical role
judges play in fashioning spoliation remedies).
16. See infra notes 50–58 and accompanying text.
17. Another example of the spoliation inference jury instruction can be found in McLain v.
Taco Bell Corp., 527 S.E.2d 712, 715 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000):
I instruct you that evidence has been presented in this case which tends to show that
the Defendant . . . either destroyed or failed to produce corporate records in its exclu-
sive possession requested by the plaintiff in this case. If you determine this to be the
case, then those [sic] would be a presumption or adverse inference against the Defen-
dant . . . that the evidence withheld would have injured the Defendants[’] . . . defense
in this case.
18. The spoliation inference also is referred to in the literature as the “adverse inference.”
See, e.g., David A. Bell, Margaret M. Koesel & Tracey L. Turnbull, Let’s Level the Playing Field:
A New Proposal for Analysis of Spoliation of Evidence Claims in Pending Litigation, 29 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 769, 790 (1997).
19. See infra Part I.A.
20. See infra Part II.A.
21. Although “spoliation” may be defined as the intentional destruction of evidence, see
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 14, at 1409, this Note adopts the broader definition of
spoliation employed by courts. See infra Part II.A.
22. See infra Part II.B.
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require the nonspoliating party to provide circumstantial evidence of
the contents of the spoliated evidence before the jury instruction will
be issued. Must the nonspoliating party present circumstantial evi-
dence regarding the spoliated evidence? If so, must the circumstantial
evidence indicate that the spoliated evidence would have been ad-
verse to the spoliating party?
This Note proposes a framework for understanding these two re-
quirements. While other responses to spoliation attempt to punish the
spoliating party or deter litigants from spoliating evidence, the spolia-
tion inference is predominantly employed as a remedial tool to re-
store balance in the pending litigation.23 In light of the remedial role
of the spoliation inference vis-à-vis other spoliation remedies, the
culpability requirement and the circumstantial evidence requirement
should work in concert to serve the same fundamental purpose—to
ensure, through the introduction of secondary evidence, that the spo-
liation inference actually will advance the objective of restoring ad-
versarial balance. In the Conclusion, this Note proposes a set of prin-
ciples that are fairly drawn from this refined understanding of the
relationship between the culpability and circumstantial evidence re-
quirements.
I.  SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE
The prevalence of spoliation in civil litigation is alarming. In
1991, a study reported that fifty percent of all litigators consider spo-
liation to be a frequent or regular occurrence.24 Less than ten years
later, the Tort and Insurance Practice Section of the American Bar
Association published the first book devoted solely to the developing
law of spoliation,25 in which the authors characterize spoliation as an
“unfortunate reality of modern-day civil litigation.”26 Other commen-
tators have likewise noted that “deliberate obstructionism is com-
23. See infra note 68 and accompanying text.
24. Nesson, supra note 15, at 793.
25. MARGARET M. KOESEL, DAVID A. BELL & TRACEY L. TURNBULL, SPOLIATION OF
EVIDENCE: SANCTIONS AND REMEDIES FOR DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE IN CIVIL
LITIGATION (2000). The proliferation of articles on spoliation of evidence may contribute to the
“hype and trepidation” surrounding this concern. Jeffrey S. Kinsler & Anne R. Keyes MacIver,
Demystifying Spoliation of Evidence, 34 TORT & INS. L.J. 761, 761 n.2 (1999).
26. KOESEL, BELL & TURNBULL, supra note 25, at xi.
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monplace”27 and that it is “difficult to exaggerate the pervasiveness of
evasive practices.”28
In response to the rise of spoliation cases nationwide, courts are
subjecting spoliation to intense scrutiny.29 One court has noted that
the “[d]estruction or loss of potentially relevant evidence is a long-
standing problem, but it has attracted increased attention in the past
decade,”30 and this attention has prompted rather rapid development
of spoliation law.31 Although the judicial approaches to spoliation
vary widely across jurisdictions,32 and although this variance poses
particular problems because courts have failed to agree on choice-of-
law principles in the realm of spoliation,33 it is nevertheless reassuring
to upstanding litigators that recent decisions indicate the “beginning
of a nationwide anti-spoliation trend.”34
A. The Duty to Preserve Evidence
Spoliation hinges upon the duty borne by each party to preserve
potentially relevant evidence; as some scholars note, “the duty to pre-
serve evidence is an absolute prerequisite for imposing sanctions on a
27. Edward J. Imwinkelried, A New Antidote for an Opponent’s Pretrial Discovery Mis-
conduct: Treating the Misconduct at Trial as an Admission by Conduct of the Weakness of the
Opponent’s Case, 1993 BYU L. REV. 793, 794.
28. Wayne D. Brazil, Civil Discovery: Lawyers’ Views of Its Effectiveness, Its Principal
Problems and Abuses, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 787, 829.
29. Bell, Koesel & Turnbull, supra note 18, at 771.
30. Henderson v. Tyrrell, 910 P.2d 522, 531 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996).
31. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 265, at 193–94 (John W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992) [here-
inafter MCCORMICK] (“This area of the law appears to be in the process of rather rapid change,
although the patterns of the new order are not yet entirely clear.”).
32. See Bell, Koesel & Turnbull, supra note 18, at 791 (“Thus far, judicial treatment of spo-
liation claims arising in the context of pending litigation has been inconsistent.”); see also
KOESEL, BELL & TURNBULL, supra note 25, at 75–201 (summarizing the developing law of spo-
liation in civil matters in state and federal courts).
33. KOESEL, BELL & TURNBULL, supra note 25, at 2:
The forum in which spoliation occurs can have a substantial impact on the resulting
remedies available to the nonspoliating party, because courts disagree . . . about
whose law applies.
Although state courts apply the forum law to spoliation claims, federal courts sit-
ting in diversity disagree about whether spoliation that occurs during pending litiga-
tion is a substantive matter, to be governed by state law, or a procedural matter, sub-
ject to federal law.
34. Sam LaManna, Courts Take a Harder Line on Spoliation, NAT’L L.J., July 26, 1993, at
17.
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party for spoliation.”35 This duty derives from three sources. First, a
duty to preserve evidence may be imposed by statute, by regulation,
or by the ethical duties of the profession.36 Second, the duty may at-
tach if the party voluntarily assumes such a duty, as when a business
implements a formal document retention policy.37 Third, and most
importantly, the duty arises when litigation is filed, threatened, or
reasonably foreseeable.38 Because the duty to preserve relevant evi-
dence may arise before litigation is formally commenced, a party39 can
35. Laurie Kindel & Kai Richter, Spoliation of Evidence: Will the New Millennium See a
Further Expansion of Sanctions for the Improper Destruction of Evidence?, 27 WM. MITCHELL
L. REV. 687, 689 (2000).
36. KOESEL, BELL & TURNBULL, supra note 25, at 4, 8.
37. Id. at 9.
38. Kindel & Richter, supra note 35, at 689 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Kinsler & Mac-
Iver, supra note 25, at 764):
[T]he duty [to preserve evidence] automatically arises when a party serves or is
served with a judicial or administrative complaint. In such a situation, the party has
actual knowledge that litigation has begun, and is therefore bound to preserve all dis-
coverable evidence. However, this duty also arises where litigation is reasonably fore-
seeable, but has not yet officially commenced. There are many situations where there
are pre-litigation communications between and among the parties that demonstrate
that, at the time of the communications, the parties anticipated a lawsuit. The duty
also arises when a party is on notice of a potential action because it has a history of
lawsuits concerning a particular product or matter and could reasonably expect to be
drawn into litigation concerning the same or similar matters. Thus, the duty to pre-
serve evidence is triggered not only by the commencement of litigation, but also when
a party is on notice that litigation is “likely to be commenced.”
Kinsler & MacIver, supra note 25, at 763 (“Absent actual notice, all forms of spoliation liability
turn on foreseeability.”).
39. Although the parties to litigation frequently perpetrate spoliation, spoliation also may
be perpetrated by nonparties (such as a third-party insurer) or by witnesses (often a party’s ex-
pert witness during the examination or investigation of physical evidence). See, e.g., Vodusek v.
Bayliner Marine Corp., 71 F.3d 148, 157 (4th Cir. 1995) (determining that remedies for spolia-
tion are available if the district court concludes that a party or her agent, in this case an expert
witness, destroyed relevant evidence); Thompson v. Owensby, 704 N.E.2d 134, 137 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1998) (concluding that an insurer’s knowledge of a party’s claim and the insurer’s posses-
sion of key evidence created a relationship between the insurer and the party that weighed in
favor of the insurer’s duty to preserve the evidence). As with the parties to litigation, nonparties
and witnesses must be subject to a duty to preserve relevant evidence before the destruction of
such evidence constitutes spoliation. As a general rule, nonparties and witnesses are not subject
to a duty to preserve relevant evidence. Koplin v. Rosel Well Perforators, Inc., 734 P.2d 1177,
1179 (Kan. 1987) (“[T]he general rule is that there is no duty to preserve possible evidence for
another party to aid that other party in some future legal action against a third party.”). This
general rule does not apply, however, when the non-party or witness is bound by a special rela-
tionship with a party to the litigation, whether by agreement, contract, statute, or some other
special circumstance. Id.
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spoliate evidence prior to the commencement of litigation, after liti-
gation commences, or during the trial itself.40
The duty to preserve evidence extends to all evidence that might
be “relevant” in reasonably foreseeable litigation.41 Relevancy must
be interpreted with reference to the applicable evidentiary rules of
each jurisdiction, and in most jurisdictions the concept of relevancy
closely tracks its treatment in the Federal Rules of Evidence. Under
the Federal Rules of Evidence, “relevant evidence” is “evidence
having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of con-
sequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence.”42 Although the
scope of relevant evidence must be viewed from the perspective of
the party charged with the duty to preserve,43 the breadth of relevancy
has prompted commentators to caution that “a party deciding
whether to preserve particular items of evidence would be well ad-
vised to err on the side of caution.”44
Courts have mitigated the early onset of the duty to preserve
evidence (which attaches whenever litigation is reasonably foresee-
able) and the expansive scope of this duty (which extends to all evi-
dence with any tendency to make a material fact more or less prob-
able) by limiting the duty by a standard of reasonableness. In the oft-
quoted language of the court in Hirsch v. General Motors Corp.,45
 “The scope of the duty to preserve evidence is not boundless. A ‘po-
tential spoliator need do only what is reasonable under the circum-
stances.’”46 Courts may consider issues of safety, expense, and cum-
40. Kenneth R. Lang et al., Spoliation of Evidence: The Continuing Search for a Remedy
and Implications for Aviation Accident Investigations, 60 J. AIR L. & COM. 997, 1000 (1995).
41. Kedigh, supra note 14, at 598 (“Spoliation is the destruction, alteration or suppression
of evidence relevant to a cause of action or potential cause of action.”).
42. FED. R. EVID. 401.
43. KOESEL, BELL & TURNBULL, supra note 25, at 9 (“In addition to determining whether
a duty exists to preserve evidence, a party also must decide what evidence should be pre-
served. . . . [T]he test is one of reasonableness, as seen from the perspective of the party charged
with that duty.”).
44. Id.
45. 628 A.2d 1108 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1993).
46. Id. at 1122 (quoting County of Solano v. Delancy, 264 Cal. Rptr. 721, 731 (Cal. Ct. App.
1989)).
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bersomeness in determining whether the preservation of relevant evi-
dence is reasonable.47
B. Responding to Spoliation
When evidence is spoliated, courts typically craft a remedy with
three distinct objectives in mind: remediation, punishment, and deter-
rence.48 The remedial goal aims to restore the adversarial balance—to
“level the playing field”49—between the nonspoliating party and the
spoliator in the pending litigation. The punishment objective reflects
the judicial desire to sanction conduct that threatens the fair and eq-
uitable administration of justice. The third goal, deterrence, attempts
to discourage future spoliation, and this goal is primarily advanced
indirectly through the punitive sanctions employed to punish a spolia-
tor. In pursuit of these objectives, courts may employ two different
approaches to confront the evils of spoliation.
When a trial court determines that a party has spoliated evidence
in a pending civil suit, the trial court may rely on collateral proceed-
ings to address the acts of spoliation. These collateral proceedings can
47. KOESEL, BELL & TURNBULL, supra note 25, at 9. In their eminently instructive book,
Koesel, Bell, and Turnbull introduce Conderman v. Rochester Gas & Electric Corp., 693
N.Y.S.2d 787 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999), as an example of a court considering the safety of preserv-
ing relevant evidence when deciding whether a party had violated the duty to preserve evidence.
KOESEL, BELL & TURNBULL, supra note 25, at 9–10. In Conderman, the plaintiffs were injured
when they were hit by a falling utility pole as they drove through a town. 693 N.Y.S.2d at 788.
The utility company sent emergency crews to the site, and the crews removed the pole from the
road by cutting the pole into four-foot sections. Id. The New York appellate court reversed the
lower court’s decision granting summary judgment to the plaintiffs because the utility company
was responding to an emergency situation that affected public safety. Id. at 789. The court con-
cluded that the utility company should not be expected to preserve the utility poles for possible
pending litigation. Id.
48. See, e.g., Shaffer v. RWP Group, Inc., 169 F.R.D. 19, 25 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (“An adverse
inference charge serves the dual purposes of remediation and punishment.”); Turner v. Hudson
Transit Lines, Inc., 142 F.R.D. 68, 75 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (“The adverse inference thus acts as a
deterrent against even the negligent destruction of evidence.”).
49. Lang et al., supra note 40, at 1001.
DROPKIN IN FINAL READ.DOC 06/03/02 12:06 PM
2002] SPOLIATION INFERENCE 1811
include criminal prosecutions,50 independent tort actions,51 and profes-
sional disciplinary proceedings.52 Such proceedings would be initiated
by a party other than the trial court,53 and the availability of these re-
sponses would be governed by statute, case precedent, and the ap-
50. Criminal liability is the most severe judicial response to spoliation, and it is employed
rarely. See Kristin Adamski, Comment, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Courtroom:
Spoliation of Evidence in Illinois, 32 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 325, 346 (1999) (“[T]here are no
cases where a party was criminally convicted for the spoliation of evidence in civil litigation.”).
Under federal law, spoliation of evidence could be prosecuted under several statutes, including
18 U.S.C. § 1503 (2000), which prohibits the obstruction of justice, and 18 U.S.C. § 2071 (2000),
which criminalizes the destruction, mutilation, or concealment of any document filed in a fed-
eral court or public office. State laws also may provide the foundation for criminal liability, al-
though such laws tend to vary dramatically across states. See Scott S. Katz & Anne Marie Mus-
caro, Spoilage of Evidence—Crimes, Sanctions, Inferences, and Torts, 29 TORT & INS. L.J. 51, 53
n.17 (1993) (cataloging state statutes that prohibit the destruction of evidence). Commentators
often acknowledge two primary shortcomings of this response to spoliation: first, criminal
prosecutions fail to satisfy the judicial objective of remediation because they do not reinstate
adversarial balance in the primary civil suit, and second, criminal prosecutions do not provide
sufficient deterrence because they are almost never feasible in light of the scarcity of prosecuto-
rial resources. KOESEL, BELL & TURNBULL, supra note 25, at 69–70.
51. Beginning with Smith v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984), over-
ruled by Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Superior Court, 954 P.2d 511 (Cal. 1998), several states have
recognized a tort for spoliation of evidence. Although only five states had recognized the cause
of action in 1997, that number had increased to twelve (and the District of Columbia) by 2000.
KOESEL, BELL & TURNBULL, supra note 25, at 50 n.2; Bell, Koesel & Turnbull, supra note 18,
at 778. The scope of the tort differs greatly across jurisdictions. Id. Although some commenta-
tors have acknowledged that the independent tort of spoliation of evidence acts as a meaningful
deterrent and compensates the nonspoliating party, most jurisdictions have opted not to recog-
nize the tort because, among other reasons, alternative remedies can respond adequately to the
spoliation problem. Compare Steffen Nolte, The Spoliation Tort: An Approach to Underlying
Principles, 26 ST. MARY’S L.J. 351, 355–56 (1995) (contending that the spoliation tort promotes
deterrence more effectively than traditional procedural remedies), with KOESEL, BELL &
TURNBULL, supra note 25, at 53 (observing that some courts have declined to recognize the tort
because other remedies are available).
52. Spoliation may have significant professional ramifications for a spoliating party’s coun-
sel. When counsel is retained in anticipation of future litigation, one court observed, the obliga-
tion to preserve evidence “ran first to counsel, who had a duty to advise his client of the type of
information potentially relevant to the lawsuit and of the necessity of preventing its destruc-
tion.” Turner v. Hudson Transit Lines, Inc., 142 F.R.D. 68, 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). According to
Rule 3.4(a) of the American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct, a lawyer
shall not “unlawfully obstruct another party’s access to evidence or unlawfully alter, destroy or
conceal a document or other material having potential evidentiary value” and “shall not counsel
or assist another person to do any such acts.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(a)
(2001). Although misconduct charges for breach of Rule 3.4 are infrequent, attorneys can be
subjected to serious sanctions (including disbarment) and malpractice liability if they spoliate
evidence. Kindel & Richter, supra note 35, at 701.
53. In the case of criminal prosecutions, the initiating party would be the government; in
the case of independent tort actions, it would be the nonspoliating party; in the case of discipli-
nary proceedings, it would be a professional organization, possibly at the behest of the nonspo-
liating party.
DROPKIN IN FINAL READ.DOC 06/03/02 12:06 PM
1812 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51:1803
propriate mechanisms for investigating allegations of professional
misconduct.
In the alternative, a trial court may opt to rectify spoliation by
imposing a sanction in the pending litigation,54 and the available sanc-
tions vary considerably. The harshest sanction brings about the com-
plete adverse disposition of a case in favor of the nonspoliating party
through a dismissal of a plaintiff-spoliator’s claim55 or a default judg-
54. A trial court derives its authority to sanction parties from the rules of civil procedure
and the court’s inherent authority. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (and many state
rules of civil procedure), a trial court may sanction the spoliating party pursuant to the provi-
sions of Rule 11 and Rule 26, though Rule 37 (“Failure to Make or Cooperate in Discovery;
Sanctions”) remains the most frequently employed basis for evidentiary sanctions. Kindel &
Richter, supra note 35, at 692:
Because spoliation of evidence clearly violates the spirit of discovery, a wide range of
sanctions may be imposed under the Rules of Civil Procedure, including dismissal of
the lawsuit, entry of a default judgment, exclusion of evidence and testimony, and as-
sessing monetary penalties. Typically, Rule 37 provides the vehicle for imposing such
sanctions.
The rules of civil procedure empower a trial court to sanction spoliation only when it occurs
during the pendency of litigation, however; the rules do not vest courts with the authority to
sanction spoliation that occurs before litigation commences. See Beil v. Lakewood Eng’g & Mfg.
Co., 15 F.3d 546, 552 (6th Cir. 1994):
This court’s decision is in no way meant to condone pre-litigation destruction of evi-
dence. The court simply recognizes that Rule 37 is a procedural rule, and like all pro-
cedural rules, it governs conduct during the pendency of a lawsuit. Rule 37 does not,
nor does any procedural rule, apply to actions that occurred prior to the lawsuit.
Cited in KOESEL, BELL & TURNBULL, supra note 25, at 29.
If spoliation occurs before litigation commences, the trial court must rely on its inher-
ent authority to sanction the spoliating party. For a discussion of the power of federal courts to
sanction spoliation pursuant to their inherent authority, see generally Iain D. Johnston, Federal
Courts’ Authority to Impose Sanctions for Prelitigation or Pre-Order Spoliation of Evidence, 156
F.R.D. 313 (1994). Although a court’s inherent authority should be exercised with great caution,
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991), it is virtually beyond dispute that “the inher-
ent power to protect against destruction of evidence is necessary to ensure the proper admini-
stration of justice.” KOESEL, BELL & TURNBULL, supra note 25, at 30.
A court has wide latitude in its selection of sanctions pursuant to the applicable rules of
civil procedure and its inherent authority. Sanctions imposed pursuant to Rule 37 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure are reviewed only for a clear abuse of discretion, e.g., Hazen v. Pasley,
768 F.2d 226, 229 (8th Cir. 1985), and the same is true of sanctions imposed under a court’s in-
herent authority, e.g., Primus Auto. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Batarse, 115 F.3d 644, 648 (9th Cir. 1997).
55. Some commentators refer to spoliation as an affirmative defense in the instances in
which spoliation has prompted trial courts to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims in products liability suits.
See, e.g., Robert L. Tucker, The Flexible Doctrine of Spoliation of Evidence: Cause of Action,
Defense, Evidentiary Presumption, and Discovery Sanction, 27 U. TOL. L. REV. 67, 74–77
(1995).
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ment rendered against a defendant-spoliator.56 If a dismissal or a de-
fault judgment would be unjustifiably harsh, a court may impose the
ostensibly milder sanction of excluding secondary evidence or expert
testimony offered by the spoliating party that relates to the spoliated
evidence.57 Although the exclusion of evidence or expert testimony is
less severe than outright dismissal or a default judgment, this sanction
may have the same operative effect: after excluding secondary evi-
dence or expert testimony, the trial court may be compelled to award
summary judgment in favor of the nonspoliating party because the
spoliating party may no longer be able to sustain its case.58 The final
sanction available to the court is the spoliation inference, which is de-
scribed in detail in the following Section.
C. The Spoliation Inference
The spoliation inference jury instruction empowers the members
of the jury, as they see fit, to draw an adverse inference against the
56. This sanction is rarely employed because it dispossesses the spoliating party of the right
to have the case adjudicated on its merits. KOESEL, BELL & TURNBULL, supra note 25, at 45.
Courts generally view the sanction of dismissal or default judgment as a last resort. E.g., Com-
puter Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Am. Fundware, Inc., 133 F.R.D. 166, 169 (D. Colo. 1990) (noting that
default judgments are reserved for egregious offenses against a party or the court). Conse-
quently, they reserve the sanction of complete adverse disposition for those circumstances
uniquely deserving of this severe remedy, which are often characterized by egregious bad faith
or the lack of another suitable judicial response. KOESEL, BELL & TURNBULL, supra note 25, at
45.
57. Tucker, supra note 55, at 76. In determining the propriety of excluding secondary evi-
dence relating to the spoliated evidence, courts generally will consider the degree of prejudice
caused by the spoliation, whether the prejudice can be cured, the practical importance of the
secondary evidence, whether the spoliator was acting in bad faith, and the potential for abuse if
the secondary evidence is admitted. Headley v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 141 F.R.D. 362, 365 (D.
Mass. 1991). In determining the propriety of excluding expert testimony, courts may be per-
suaded that an expert should not be permitted to share firsthand knowledge of relevant evi-
dence after that evidence has been destroyed by the expert or the party retaining that expert.
Lang et al., supra note 40, at 1017. When the trial court believes that the nonspoliating party is
entitled to the benefit of the spoliation inference, see infra Part I.C, the exclusion of expert tes-
timony may prove indispensable. If the nonspoliating party must rely on the benefit of the spo-
liation inference while the spoliating party gains the benefit of an expert witness’s testimony
(which is uncontroverted because the evidence has been spoliated), the spoliation inference may
cease to offer any relief to the nonspoliating party.
58. Lang et al., supra note 40, at 1015; see also Simons v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc.,
No. 95-2705, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2695, at *13 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 7, 1996) (“[I]n such cases, the
judgment itself is not the sanction; rather, the exclusion of the evidence is the sanction. ‘Judg-
ment only follows because the party cannot otherwise prove its case.’”) (quoting Donohue v.
Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc., 155 F.R.D. 515, 520 (M.D. Pa. 1994)); KOESEL, BELL & TURNBULL,
supra note 25, at 42 (quoting the same language from the Simons decision).
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spoliating party.59 In its simplest form, the spoliation inference may
resemble the following instruction:
When evidence is within the control of a party whose natural inter-
ests it would be to produce that evidence, and that party destroys
the evidence without adequate cause, it may be inferred that such
evidence would be unfavorable to that party.60
Although the spoliation inference is only one option among the
court’s arsenal of potential responses to spoliation, the spoliation in-
ference is prominently employed because its use comports with the
judicial commitment to “select the least onerous sanction corre-
sponding to the willfulness of the destructive act and the prejudice
suffered by the victim.”61 Unlike a collateral proceeding (such as an
independent tort action based on intentional or negligent spoliation),
the use of the spoliation inference avoids the costs of collateral litiga-
tion.62 And in contrast to the extreme remedies of dismissal or default
judgment, the spoliation inference may be the most appropriate and
proportional judicial response.63
59. The spoliation inference also enjoys a noble pedigree dating back to Armory v. De-
lamirie, 93 Eng. Rep. 664 (K.B. 1722), the famous chimney-sweep’s jewel case. For a summary
of the case, see JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 104 (3d ed. 1993). In Ar-
mory, a chimney-sweep’s boy found a jewel and took the jewel to a goldsmith’s shop. Id. The
goldsmith’s apprentice, under pretense of weighing the jewel, removed the precious stones and
informed the goldsmith that the jewel was worth three half-pence. Id. When the chimney-
sweeper’s boy refused to accept three half-pence for the stones, the apprentice returned the
socket to the boy without the precious stones. Id. In an action in trover, several individuals in
the jewel trade testified to the maximum value of a jewel that could fit in the socket. Id. The
chief justice instructed that unless the defendant produced the jewel and showed that it was not
“of the finest water, the jury should presume the strongest against him, and make the value of
the best jewels the measure of their damages, which they accordingly did.” Id. In issuing this
adverse inference instruction to the jury, the chief justice in Armory also announced the legal
maxim that would forever be associated with the spoliation inference: “contra spoliatorem om-
nia praesumuntur”—“All things are presumed against the spoliator.” KOESEL, BELL &
TURNBULL, supra note 25, at xiii.
60. Henderson v. Tyrrell, 910 P.2d 522, 534 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996).
61. JAMES GORELICK, DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE § 3.16, at 117 (1989); see also Gates
Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 167 F.R.D. 90, 106 (D. Colo. 1996) (concluding that
courts should employ the “least onerous sanction” to remedy spoliation); Patton v. Newmar
Corp., 520 N.W.2d 4, 8 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (concluding that a court has a “duty to impose the
least restrictive sanction available under the circumstances” in a spoliation case), rev’d on other
grounds, 538 N.W.2d 116 (Minn. 1995).
62. KOESEL, BELL & TURNBULL, supra note 25, at 40.
63. To draw on a popular analogy, the spoliation inference may be the judiciary’s “card-
board sword” properly employed to slay a mouse:
In general, a trial court confronted by sanctionable behavior should consider the
purpose to be achieved by a given sanction and then craft a sanction adequate to
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Despite the value of the inference as a less severe response to
spoliation, some courts and commentators criticize the spoliation in-
ference because it fails to advance the objectives of punishment and
deterrence. Standing alone, the spoliation inference is insufficient to
punish a spoliator in pending litigation or deter a potential spoliator
from destroying or altering relevant evidence. The inference fails as a
punitive response because, even in its strongest application, it at-
tempts only to level the playing field.64 It is equally true that the infer-
ence fails as a deterrent because the inference is permissive rather
serve that purpose. While we eschew the imposition of rigid guidelines for the trial
courts in this circumstance-specific area of the law, the judge should take pains nei-
ther to use an elephant gun to slay a mouse nor to wield a cardboard sword if a
dragon looms.
Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co., 900 F.2d 388, 395 (1st Cir. 1990) (citations omitted).
64. KOESEL, BELL & TURNBULL, supra note 25, at 41. The spoliation inference’s scienter
requirement plays a particularly important role in evaluating the punitive effect of the inference.
When a party destroys evidence intentionally or in bad faith, a fair presumption arises that the
spoliated evidence may have been unfavorable to that party. In these cases, the spoliation infer-
ence fails to serve a punitive purpose because the inference attempts only to level the playing
field. When evidence is spoliated in bad faith, it is unlikely that the spoliating party will perceive
the inference as a punishment at all; a party that spoliates evidence in bad faith would almost
always prefer a permissive spoliation inference to the introduction of the evidence. On this ba-
sis, alternative responses to spoliation are best suited to address intentional or bad faith spolia-
tion. On the other hand, as the culpability of the spoliator decreases from intentionality to
recklessness, negligence, or innocence, the punitive role of the spoliation inference is enhanced.
In these circumstances, the spoliating party (which has acted recklessly, negligently, or inno-
cently) might very well perceive the spoliation inference as a punishment because the inference
may prove far more damning than the spoliated evidence. This Note contends that this punitive
aspect of the spoliation inference is undesirable for two reasons. First, it creates a disturbing dy-
namic wherein the severity of punishment increases as the culpability of the spoliator decreases.
Second, some commentators contend that the spoliation inference permits the jury to consider
evidence that has not been submitted, a notion “inimical to the U.S. judicial system.” Jerrold
Abeles & Robert J. Tyson, Spoil Sport, L.A. LAWYER, May 1999, at 41, 46, quoted in KOESEL,
BELL & TURNBULL, supra note 25, at 41. It is inappropriate to permit the jury to consider evi-
dence that has not been submitted as a means to punish a party—particularly an innocent
party—when evidence has been destroyed.
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than mandatory65—the jury decides the impact of the inference66 and
it may reject the inference outright.67 
Although the spoliation inference serves the remediation objec-
tive almost to the exclusion of deterrence or punishment,68 the con-
cern that the inference does not punish wrongdoers is largely without
merit. The spoliation inference may be relatively toothless compared
with its counterparts, but a court will not be compelled to employ the
spoliation inference in cases in which a spoliator’s conduct should be
punished more severely.69 The relative weakness of the spoliation in-
ference as a means of punishment does not diminish its value in cases
in which a court needs only to employ a milder sanction to “level the
playing field.”
A similar critique can be made of the inference’s failure to deter
spoliation. The deterrent effect of the spoliation inference should not
be evaluated in isolation. Instead, the deterrent nature of the entire
spoliation regime (which, depending on the jurisdiction, may include
civil or criminal liability, professional sanctions, discovery sanctions,
and/or the threat of dismissal or default judgment) is the appropriate
65. Blinzler v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 81 F.3d 1148, 1159 (1st Cir. 1996). At best, the spoliation
inference may deter parties from allowing evidence to be spoliated through the parties’ negli-
gence or recklessness. The inference, standing alone, is powerless to deter bad faith spoliation
(because the inference will never be more damning than the evidence), and it is likewise pow-
erless to deter innocent spoliation (because the party was not culpable). In rare circumstances,
therefore, the potential availability of the spoliation inference may persuade a party to avoid
any negligent or reckless conduct that may result in the destruction of relevant evidence. This
Note contends that this deterrent effect is misunderstood. The spoliation inference is permis-
sive, and it is unclear whether a party’s negligence or recklessness would be affected by the po-
tential availability of a permissive inference. And if a potential spoliator contemplates the avail-
ability of the spoliation inference when it determines whether it should act negligently or
recklessly, it appears equally clear that the potential spoliator will consider all of the other pos-
sible responses to spoliation. Because other responses to spoliation are harsher than the infer-
ence, the potential spoliator’s a priori consideration of the inference should never singlehand-
edly deter a spoliator.
66. KOESEL, BELL & TURNBULL, supra note 25, at 41.
67. Blinzler, 81 F.3d at 1159.
68. Although some courts have suggested that the spoliation inference serves to punish
wrongdoers, see, e.g., Shaffer v. RWP Group, Inc., 169 F.R.D. 19, 25 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (noting
that such an inference serves the dual purposes of remediation and punishment), this proposi-
tion seems defensible only if juries entertain an inference against the spoliator that is far more
detrimental to the spoliator’s case than the destroyed evidence would have been. Evaluating the
frequency of this circumstance is difficult because the impact of the inference is determined en-
tirely by the jury. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
69. To return to the analogy presented earlier, see supra note 63, a court will not be com-
pelled to use the spoliation inference’s cardboard sword when a judicial elephant gun would be
appropriate.
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unit for consideration because a potential spoliator will not know a
priori which sanction the court will employ. Viewed as one response
among many that can be employed to thwart a spoliator, the spolia-
tion inference occupies a critical position in the judge’s arsenal and
may often prove to be the “least onerous sanction” available to rec-
tify the destruction of potentially relevant evidence. Properly con-
strued, the spoliation inference is a valuable and fundamentally re-
medial response to spoliation.
II.  TWO UNRESOLVED REQUIREMENTS: CULPABILITY AND
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
A. The Culpability Requirement
Assume the following scenario.70 Amidst a devastating economic
downturn marked by declining revenues, John Doe, the supervisor of
Acme Widget Works, Inc., was informed by senior management that
ten employees would be terminated pursuant to an involuntary reduc-
tion-in-force (RIF). Doe received a “supervisor’s package” that de-
scribed the appropriate procedures for identifying the ten employees
to be terminated pursuant to the RIF. Doe was instructed to define
skill sets, identify the number of employees required at each skill
level, review the qualifications of each employee, select the most
qualified employees, and identify surplus employees. Doe distributed
this information to his three assistant supervisors, and over the fol-
lowing week he convened a series of meetings with his assistants to
identify the ten employees to be terminated.
Two weeks later, Doe met with David Smith to inform him that
he had been terminated under the RIF. Smith, a black male, alleged
that his termination was motivated by race in violation of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964,71 and he filed suit against Acme Widget
Works. Smith contended that Doe and Doe’s assistant supervisors
deviated materially from the official instructions embodied in the su-
pervisor’s package and created their own system for identifying sur-
plus employees. Pursuant to the rules of discovery, Smith sought ac-
cess to the charts, notes, and other documents that recorded the
70. This scenario is loosely modeled on the underlying facts of Scott v. IBM Corp., 196
F.R.D. 233 (D.N.J. 2000).
71. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994) (declaring that it shall be an unlawful employment
practice for an employer to “discharge any individual . . . because of such individual’s race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin”).
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decisionmaking process employed in Doe’s meetings with his assistant
supervisors. At a minimum, these charts specified the standards em-
ployed by Doe and the rank order of the bottom fifteen “surplus”
employees.
Now consider five explanations for the destruction of the charts,
notes, and documents:
 Doe carefully collected the notes, charts, and documents
from the meetings and placed them in a secure file in his of-
fice. Three days after the meetings concluded, however,
Acme Widget Works was attacked by an arsonist, and all of
the files in Doe’s office were destroyed in the fire.
 Doe carefully collected the notes, charts, and documents
from the meetings and placed them in a file in his office. Two
days later, he decided to review the file during his lunch
break at a local diner. When he arrived at the diner, however,
he encountered an old friend, they dined together, and Doe
inadvertently left the file on the table when he departed.
 Doe collected the notes, charts, and documents and placed
them in a file in the corporate fileroom. Three days later,
Doe asked a fileroom worker to organize the RIF file. Doe
was aware that the same fileroom worker had discarded es-
sential documents two months ago when instructed to “or-
ganize a sales file.” The fileroom worker discarded the notes,
charts, and documents.
 Following the meeting, Doe commented that the RIF meet-
ings had generated a daunting amount of paperwork. Be-
cause Doe and his assistant supervisors were moving to an-
other office, he feared that the massive paperwork would
prove overly burdensome during the move. He collected all
of the notes, charts, and documents and destroyed them.
 Following the meeting, Doe acknowledged that the RIF
might prompt disgruntled surplus employees to file “frivo-
lous” discrimination claims. He directed his assistant supervi-
sors to submit all notes, charts, and documents from the RIF
meetings to him to ensure that “the details of our decision
will never see the light of day.”
In these five scenarios, relevant evidence has been destroyed af-
ter Acme Widget Works (and John Doe) should have known that liti-
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gation was reasonably foreseeable. But these scenarios illustrate that
a spoliator can act with significantly different levels of culpability,
ranging from innocence to bad faith. Should a spoliation inference be
available in all of these circumstances? And if not, where should the
line be drawn?
Courts have differed widely in their approach to the scienter re-
quirement for the spoliation inference.72 In some jurisdictions, the
spoliation inference is available only if the evidence is destroyed in
bad faith.73 Some courts have relaxed the culpability requirement
slightly, however, concluding that the spoliation inference should be
available even if the spoliator has intentionally destroyed the evi-
dence without bad faith.74 Several courts have dispensed with the in-
tent requirement altogether, permitting a spoliation inference instruc-
tion if the spoliator’s conduct was reckless or grossly negligent.75
Lastly, some jurisdictions have relaxed the culpability requirement
even more, and these courts may issue a spoliation inference instruc-
tion even if the spoliator’s conduct was merely negligent.76
In stark contrast, commentators propose a strict liability ap-
proach to the spoliation inference. In an important article published
in 1997,77 David Bell, Margaret Koesel, and Tracey Turnbull78 propose
72. Kedigh, supra note 14, at 598–99.
73. E.g., Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Jacobson, 827 F.2d 1119, 1134–35 (7th Cir.
1987); Wright ex rel. Wright v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 868 F. Supp. 183, 188 (S.D. Miss. 1994);
Scout v. City of Gordon, 849 F. Supp. 687, 691 (D. Neb. 1994). When the spoliation inference is
confined to circumstances evincing the spoliator’s bad faith, courts often conclude that “the in-
ference presupposes that consciousness of wrongdoing motivated the spoliation, and that giving
the instruction only makes sense if there was an intent to spoliate.” KOESEL, BELL &
TURNBULL, supra note 25, at 37.
74. E.g., Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp., 72 F.3d 326, 334 (3d Cir. 1995); Beers v.
Bayliner Marine Corp., 675 A.2d 829, 832–33 (Conn. 1996); Collins v. Throckmorton, 425 A.2d
146, 150 (Del. 1980).
75. E.g., Reilly v. Natwest Mkts. Group Inc., 181 F.3d 253, 267–68 (2d Cir. 1999); Battocchi
v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 581 A.2d 759, 767 (D.C. 1990).
76. E.g., Glover v. BIC Corp., 6 F.3d 1318, 1329 (9th Cir. 1993); Nation-Wide Check Corp.
v. Forest Hills Distribs., Inc., 692 F.2d 214, 219 (1st Cir. 1982); Baliotis v. McNeil, 870 F. Supp.
1285, 1291–92 (M.D. Pa. 1994); Turner v. Hudson Transit Lines, Inc., 142 F.R.D. 68, 72
(S.D.N.Y. 1991).
77. Bell, Koesel & Turnbull, supra note 18.
78. Bell, Koesel, and Turnbull are private practice commercial litigation attorneys at the
law firm of Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur. Id. at 769. Their proposal merits serious considera-
tion in light of their recent book on spoliation published by the American Bar Association’s
Tort and Insurance Practice Section. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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that all spoliation sanctions—including the spoliation inference79—
should be issued without regard to the spoliator’s culpability.80 If the
alleged victim of spoliation can make a threshold showing that a
spoliation remedy is necessary,81 they argue, the court should
determine the proper remedy for spoliation without regard to the
spoliator’s state of mind.82
B. The Circumstantial Evidence Requirement
For centuries, courts disfavored the view that the spoliation in-
ference, standing alone, operated as sufficient evidence of the con-
tents of the spoliated evidence.83 John Henry Wigmore noted that
79. The authors conclude,
In relatively rare instances, the spoliated evidence will prejudice a party so severely
that the only just result, harsh though it may be, is dismissal or default judgment. In
many other cases, the exclusion of evidence, an adverse inference, or another remedy
may be sufficient to remedy any prejudice. In still other cases, the spoliator will be
able to show that the missing evidence is cumulative or trivial, in which case no preju-
dice will have occurred and no remedy will be necessary. The trial court is well placed
to make these judgment calls.
Bell, Koesel & Turnbull, supra note 18, at 802 (emphasis added). This excerpt clearly indicates
that the authors would include a spoliation inference in their strict liability paradigm.
80. This framework is based in large part on three observations about the current state of
spoliation jurisprudence. Initially, they note that courts employ a variety of tests to analyze spo-
liation when the issue arises in pending litigation. Id. at 799. Second, they observe that courts
tend to focus on two considerations in fashioning a spoliation remedy: the spoliator’s state of
mind and the prejudice to the nonspoliating party. Id. Lastly, they note that courts often blur
these two considerations, combining them into a single analysis. Id.
81. First, the nonspoliating party must show that the alleged spoliator was subject to a duty
to preserve relevant or potentially relevant evidence. Id. at 799. For further discussion of the
duty to preserve relevant evidence, see supra Part I.A. Second, the nonspoliating party must
make a showing that the alleged spoliator failed to preserve such evidence. Bell, Koesel &
Turnbull, supra note 18, at 800. Third, the nonspoliating party must show that it has suffered
prejudice as a result of the spoliation. Id. The alleged spoliator is entitled to the opportunity to
rebut this showing through the introduction of evidence tending to disprove one of the three
threshold requirements. Id.
82. Id. at 800 (“State of mind is not a consideration at this juncture.”). Moreover, the
authors assert without qualification that “[t]his analysis should not take into account the state of
mind of the spoliator.” Id. at 799. They justify this approach on three grounds: it ensures fairness
by placing the adverse consequences of the loss of evidence on the party responsible for its de-
struction, it promotes the institutional interests of the adversarial system by promoting the
search for truth, and it creates greater incentives for parties to preserve relevant evidence. Id. at
800–03.
83. See Hanson v. Eustace, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 653, 708 (1844) (“The refusal to produce
books, under a notice, lays the foundation for the introduction of secondary evidence. It affords
neither presumptive nor prima facie evidence of the fact sought to be proved by them.”). It
should be noted, however, that a distinction may be drawn between the failure to produce evi-
dence—which may not provide prima facie evidence of the fact sought to be proven—and the
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“the real field for controversy remains . . . whether the inference
alone will suffice as evidence of the contents of the document in ques-
tion.”84 Although courts have departed considerably from the un-
qualified conviction that the spoliation inference is insufficient, ab-
sent extrinsic evidence, to serve as evidence of the contents of the
spoliated evidence, judicial treatment of the circumstantial evidence
requirement for the spoliation inference remains muddled.
Some courts remain reluctant to issue the inference instruction
unless the nonspoliating party offers extrinsic evidence that the con-
tents of the spoliated evidence were unfavorable to the spoliator. The
rationale for this heightened circumstantial evidence requirement is
most clearly articulated in Turner v. Hudson Transit Lines, Inc.85 In
Turner, the plaintiff sued the operator of a bus after the bus was in-
volved in a collision on the New Jersey turnpike.86 The plaintiff, a pas-
senger on the bus, alleged that the bus’s brakes were not in good or-
der, and the plaintiff sought a spoliation inference because the bus’s
maintenance records had been destroyed.87 After the court deter-
mined that the bus operator’s reckless conduct caused the loss of the
bus’s maintenance records,88 the court focused its attention upon the
controversial and often misunderstood circumstantial evidence re-
quirement.
The court initially observed that “there must be some showing
that there is in fact a nexus between the proposed inference and the
information contained in the lost evidence.”89 Some commentators,
the court observed, would require only that the nonspoliating party
establish the identity of the spoliated evidence.90 The Turner court,
destruction of evidence—which may provide presumptive evidence of the fact sought to be
proven.
84. 2 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 291, at 227 (Chadbourn rev. ed.
1979). One commentator, answering in the negative, noted in 1806 that “‘[w]hat is said . . . re-
specting leaving the refusal [to produce relevant evidence] as a presumption to the jury should
be received with considerable qualification; for it cannot be admitted that such a presumption
should stand instead of all other evidence and supply the total deficiency of proof.’” Id. (quoting
2 W.D. EVANS, NOTES TO POTHIER 145 (1806)).
85. 142 F.R.D. 68 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
86. Id. at 70.
87. Id. at 70–71.
88. Id. at 76.
89. Id.
90. Id.
DROPKIN IN FINAL READ.DOC 06/03/02 12:06 PM
1822 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51:1803
however, acknowledged that
in fact courts have generally required some greater showing of the
content of the destroyed evidence before drawing an adverse infer-
ence. . . . [S]ome extrinsic evidence of the content of the evidence is
necessary for the trier of fact to be able to determine in what respect
and to what extent it would have been detrimental. This corrobora-
tion requirement is even more necessary where the destruction was
merely negligent, since in those cases it cannot be inferred from the
conduct of the spoliator that the evidence would even have been
harmful to him.91
The court ultimately concluded that the spoliation inference is not
warranted when there is no extrinsic evidence indicating that the spo-
liated evidence would have been unfavorable to the spoliating party.92
While some courts, like the Turner court, have required the pres-
entation of extrinsic evidence that the contents of the spoliated evi-
dence would have been adverse to the spoliator,93 several courts have
declined to impose such a demand. These courts most often rely on
the guidance of Professor John Henry Wigmore, who wrote,
The failure or refusal to produce a relevant document, or the de-
struction of it, is evidence from which alone its contents may be in-
ferred to be unfavorable to the possessor, provided the opponent,
when the identity of the document is disputed, first introduces some
evidence tending to show that the document actually destroyed or
withheld is the one as to whose contents it is desired to draw an in-
ference. In applying this rule, care should be taken not to require
anything like specific details of contents, but merely such evidence as
goes to general marks of identity.94
This less demanding circumstantial evidence requirement—which re-
quires that the nonspoliating party merely establish the identity of the
spoliated evidence—may be referred to as “Wigmore’s Rule.”
91. Id. at 77.
92. Id.
93. See Nation-Wide Check Corp. v. Forest Hill Distribs., Inc., 692 F.2d 214, 218–19 (1st
Cir. 1982) (requiring that extrinsic evidence be relevant and probative to show that the spoliated
evidence was adverse, but recognizing that the extrinsic evidence need not be independently
sufficient to warrant such a conclusion); Stanojev v. Ebasco Servs., Inc., 643 F.2d 914, 923–24
(2d Cir. 1981) (finding that the failure to produce charts containing performance evaluations
could not support an inference that an employee was discharged due to age discrimination).
94. WIGMORE, supra note 84, § 291, at 228 (emphasis added and emphasis omitted).
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Wigmore’s Rule contemplates the destruction of a particular
document known by both parties potentially to contain relevant evi-
dence in the case.95 In Kronisch v. United States,96 however, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit extended the scope of
Wigmore’s Rule.97 The plaintiff in Kronisch contended that he was
unwittingly drugged with LSD in a Paris café as part of a confidential
CIA research program.98 After the CIA destroyed all of its files re-
lated to the MKULTRA program, a study of the effects of chemical
and biological agents on human behavior, the plaintiff argued that the
spoliated files would have contained evidence that he was one of the
subjects of the program.99 Because the entire file had been spoliated
by the CIA, the plaintiff was unable to identify a particular document
of crucial importance.100 In this “more complex” situation, however,
the Kronisch court still opined that the basic principle underlying
Wigmore’s Rule was applicable.101 The court concluded,
Just how much evidence is enough to support an inference about the
content of destroyed evidence cannot be precisely defined, and will
necessarily vary from case to case, but we remain mindful of Wig-
more’s admonition that “care should be taken” not to require too
specific a level of proof. Indeed, holding the prejudiced party to too
strict a standard of proof regarding the likely contents of the de-
stroyed evidence would subvert the prophylactic and punitive pur-
poses of the adverse inference, and would allow parties who have in-
tentionally destroyed evidence to profit from that destruction.102
The Kronisch court’s approach to the circumstantial evidence re-
quirement deviates significantly from the approach adopted by the
Turner court. While the Turner court departed from Wigmore’s Rule
and held that extrinsic evidence of the contents of spoliated evidence
is necessary, the Kronisch court adhered to—and even extended—
Wigmore’s admonition that courts should not require evidence
tending to show that spoliated evidence would have been adverse to
95. Id.
96. 150 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 1998).
97. See id. at 128 (noting that “there can be no doubt that the same basic principle pro-
posed by Wigmore still applies” when a party loses the opportunity to identify a document
likely to contain important evidence because the files containing that particular document are
destroyed).
98. Id. at 116.
99. Id. at 118, 129.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. (citations omitted).
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to show that spoliated evidence would have been adverse to the spo-
liator.
III.  RECASTING THE CULPABILITY AND CIRCUMSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE REQUIREMENTS
Must the nonspoliating party establish the culpability of the spo-
liator before a spoliation inference is issued, and if so, what is the
minimum level of culpability that must be shown? Must the nonspo-
liating party present circumstantial evidence regarding the spoliated
evidence, and if so, must the circumstantial evidence indicate that the
spoliated evidence would have been adverse to the spoliating party?
Although several courts and commentators have addressed these im-
portant questions, a uniform national approach has not emerged. This
Note contends that a uniform approach has not emerged because
courts and commentators have failed to consider a third, more fun-
damental, question: how should the culpability and circumstantial
evidence requirements work together to ensure that the spoliation in-
ference properly serves its remedial purpose?
A. Linking Culpability and Circumstantial Evidence
A proper analysis of this question necessarily begins with Wig-
more’s Rule. The rule requires the nonspoliating party to introduce
extrinsic evidence tending to show that the destroyed document was
the document from which the desired inference would be drawn, but
does not require the nonspoliating party to offer extrinsic evidence
that the contents of the destroyed document were unfavorable to the
spoliator.103 Thus, the rule proposes a departure from the “current of
authority” that refuses to treat the spoliation inference as sufficient
evidence of the contents of the destroyed evidence.104
Sadly, courts have failed to fully appreciate that this influential
rule applies under the presumption that the spoliating party has en-
gaged in the intentional destruction of evidence. Wigmore prefaces
the articulation of his rule with the following observations:
[A]fter all, why is any additional evidence required as a matter of
law? All that is asked is that the jury be allowed to make the infer-
103. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
104. See WIGMORE, supra note 84, § 291, at 227 (“The truth is that there is no reason why
the utmost inference logically possible should not be allowable, namely, that the contents of the
document . . . are what he alleges them to be.”).
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ence if they are in truth convinced to that effect. What hardship or
unfairness is involved to the possessor of the document? He has de-
liberately failed to show, by production, that which it was in his
power to show, and he has by hypothesis given no other fact in ex-
planation than the apparent one, namely, that he is afraid to submit
the document to the tribunal’s inspection. If there were any risk of
the inference being too strong, would he not immediately make pro-
duction? And does not his failure to do so indicate that the produc-
tion would, in his belief, be more damaging to him than any infer-
ences which the tribunal may make for lack of the document
itself?105
The failure of courts to appreciate that Wigmore’s Rule is presented
in the context of intentional destruction belies a more significant
shortcoming of spoliation jurisprudence: courts and commentators
have failed to appreciate the relationship between culpability and the
circumstantial evidence requirement.
Wigmore’s approach to the spoliation inference implicitly recog-
nizes a principle of utmost importance. The rule is premised on the
rationale that extrinsic evidence of the contents should not be re-
quired because, by supposition, the evidence has been deliberately
destroyed or withheld. The tacit assumption underlying Wigmore’s
approach, therefore, is that the circumstantial evidence requirement
must bear some relation to the culpability requirement (and vice
versa). Although this observation proves helpful in identifying a link
between the culpability and circumstantial evidence inquiries, it
leaves yet another question unanswered: why are these two appar-
ently distinct requirements intertwined?
The spoliation inference primarily serves the purpose of reme-
diation—it attempts to restore the adversarial balance that was dis-
rupted when the spoliating party innocently, negligently, recklessly,
or intentionally (with or without bad faith) permitted relevant evi-
dence to be destroyed.106 But the destruction of evidence, standing
alone, may not provide sufficient assurances that the inference will
restore this balance. For instance, if evidence is destroyed innocently,
there are no extrinsic indications that the evidence was adverse to the
“spoliating” party and, as a result, the spoliation inference may work
a substantial injustice. If the primary objective of the spoliation infer-
ence is the restoration of adversarial balance, the culpability and cir-
105. Id. (emphasis added).
106. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
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cumstantial evidence requirements should be applied in a manner
that aids courts in assuring that the spoliation inference is an equita-
ble remedy.
In light of the remedial objective of the spoliation inference, it
becomes apparent that the culpability requirement and the circum-
stantial evidence requirement serve the same fundamental purpose:
to ensure that the spoliation inference is more likely to restore than
disrupt the adversarial balance in pending litigation. The basic intui-
tion behind the spoliation inference is the “‘common sense observa-
tion that a party who has notice that [evidence] is relevant to litiga-
tion and who proceeds to destroy [it] is more likely to have been
threatened by [that evidence] than is a party in the same position who
does not destroy the [evidence].’”107 This common sense observation
does not hold true, however, when the spoliator is innocent, and it
likewise may not hold true when the spoliator is guilty of merely neg-
ligent or reckless conduct. As the culpability of the spoliating party
increases (from innocence to bad faith conduct), the intuitive appeal
of the “common sense” assumption underlying the inference in-
creases. In contrast to collateral proceedings (such as a cause of ac-
tion in tort), however, the culpability of the spoliator is not a central
issue in assessing punishment or in gauging the need for deterrence.
Instead, the spoliator’s state of mind serves as a proxy for the con-
tents of the evidence when the culpability of the spoliator is suffi-
ciently high.
Similarly, when the nonspoliating party offers extrinsic evidence
that the contents of the spoliated evidence are unfavorable to the
spoliating party, it appears more likely that the spoliation inference is
warranted. The application of the spoliation inference would be fairly
effortless if extrinsic evidence of the contents of destroyed evidence
were always available. Such evidence, even when the evidence is
purely circumstantial, increases the court’s confidence that an adverse
inference instruction will not be unjust (i.e., it will restore adversarial
balance and level the playing field). But the spoliation inference itself
is a concession to the fact that such circumstantial evidence will not
always (and may rarely) be available. Although the availability of
such evidence reinforces the conviction that the spoliation inference
is a fair remedy, the circumstantial evidence requirement must work
107. KOESEL, BELL & TURNBULL, supra note 25, at 36 (quoting Nation-Wide Check Corp.
v. Forest Hills Distribs., Inc., 692 F.2d 214, 218 (1st Cir. 1982)).
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in concert with other considerations, such as culpability, to establish
the equity of a spoliation inference.
Bearing in mind the connection between the culpability require-
ment and the circumstantial evidence requirement, this Note pro-
poses a framework to guide a court’s preliminary consideration of a
spoliation inference, as presented in Table 1:
TABLE 1: A CULPABILITY/CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
FRAMEWORK FOR THE SPOLIATION INFERENCE
Level of Culpability Innocent Negligent Reckless Intentional Bad
Faith
Circumstantial Evidence
Establishing the Contents
of the Spoliated
Evidence Required?
Yes Yes Yes No No
Circumstantial Evidence
Establishing the Identity
of the Spoliated
Evidence Required?
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
B. Four Guiding Principles
1. Circumstantial Evidence of Identity Is Always Required. In all
circumstances, the nonspoliating party must provide adequate extrin-
sic proof that the spoliated evidence is, in fact, the evidence from
which the nonspoliating party hopes to draw an inference. This
proposition has not been challenged by courts or commentators. The
nonspoliating party should be required to offer general marks of iden-
tity to meet this burden in accordance with Wigmore’s Rule.
2. A Traditional Strict Liability Approach Is Inappropriate. The
availability of the inference should not be determined without regard
to the spoliator’s state of mind. In certain circumstances, the spolia-
tor’s state of mind can eliminate the need for an independent re-
quirement of extrinsic proof of the contents of the spoliated evidence.
This aspect of the framework, which suggests that proof of bad faith
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or intentional destruction need not be supplemented by proof of the
contents of the spoliated evidence, does not disturb the foundation of
Wigmore’s Rule.
3. Bad Faith Is Sufficient but Not Necessary. The framework
proposed in this Note rejects the governing law in many jurisdictions
that bad faith (or, in some jurisdictions, intent) is a requirement for
the spoliation inference. In conformity with Wigmore’s Rule, the
framework recharacterizes bad faith and intent as sufficient but not
necessary to activate the spoliation inference. Because the spoliation
inference is a fundamentally remedial response, this framework does
not foreclose the availability of the inference to rectify innocent, neg-
ligent, or reckless destruction as long as the nonspoliating party pro-
vides additional evidence that the inference is more likely to restore
than disrupt adversarial balance.
4. There Is No Minimum Culpability Requirement. The frame-
work adopts, in part, the strict liability approach proposed by some
commentators by permitting the issuance of a spoliation inference
even when the spoliating party is innocent. The inference, when
properly understood, should not be employed as a means of punish-
ment or deterrence; it is an imprecise and unwieldy tool for these
purposes. Because the spoliation inference is fundamentally distinct
from judicial responses that attempt to punish or deter, the availabil-
ity of the inference should not hinge solely upon the culpability of the
spoliator. Even if evidence is spoliated innocently, the inference in-
struction should be issued if the nonspoliating party offers circum-
stantial evidence that the contents of the spoliated evidence were ad-
verse to the spoliator.
CONCLUSION
The spoliation inference has become a valuable, arguably indis-
pensable, tool for courts to employ to rectify the destruction, mutila-
tion, alteration, or concealment of relevant evidence. As the Ameri-
can justice system acknowledges the regrettable prevalence of
spoliation in modern-day litigation, the victims of spoliation will pur-
sue a more refined understanding of the prerequisites for this eviden-
tiary sanction. Consequently, courts must strive to establish require-
ments for the spoliation inference that ensure that the inference will
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satisfy its primary remedial purpose—to restore adversarial balance
by leveling the playing field between spoliator and nonspoliator. 
This Note has illuminated the disagreement across jurisdictions
regarding the culpability and circumstantial evidence requirements
for the spoliation inference, and has proposed a framework that
courts can employ to ensure that the spoliation inference serves its
purpose. The culpability and circumstantial evidence requirements
should work together to provide adequate assurance that the spolia-
tion inference will have a tendency to restore and not disrupt the ad-
versarial balance. In crafting a framework for evaluating the suitabil-
ity of a spoliation inference, courts should recognize this fundamental
connection between the culpability requirement and the circumstan-
tial evidence requirement, and employ the framework developed in
this Note to govern the consideration of a spoliation inference jury in-
struction.
